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Venture Capital, Private Firms,
and the Capital Acquisition Process
Rick H. Mull

This paper presents an empirical examination o f the incentives motivating
venture capitalists and sample o f growth option intensive private firms with acute
capital requirements to interact, the gains each group achieves through this
association, the types o f private firms successftilly attracting venture capital, and
mechanisms used in this funding process. Results show that venture capital
backed firms achieve growth rates (1) greater than expected, and (2) greater than
a matched sample o f non-venture capital backed firms. This paper also finds that
low collateral asset values, low profitability, and younger firm age to be significant
determinants in which firms obtain venture capital funding. Finally, this paper
shows that the use o f the convertible preferred stock to be positively related to
increasing firm risk, and that venture capital backed firms use convertible pre
ferred stock more frequendy than do non-venture capital backed firms.

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent venture capital research provides insight into the certification role of
venture capitalists, their contract structures, risk/return characteristics, and
investment decision processes^ Yet no empirical analysis currendy exists
examining how venture capitalists benefit by providing funds to private firms,
nor the mechanisms they use in providing fiinds to private firms^. Addition
ally, there is limited empirical literature focusing on private firms with acute
capital requirements, the specific mechanisms used by such firms in overcom
ing barriers to capital formation, and how these firms benefit by the use of
venture capital. This paper integrates these ideas, examining the incentives
motivating venture capitalists and private firms to interact, the gains each
group achieves through this association, the types of private firms successfully
attracting venture capital, and mechanisms used in this fiinding process.
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To explore this process, a matched sample of venture capital backed and
non-venture capital backed private firms in high growth potential industries
is identified. These private firms are confronted by the limited capital re
sources of private equity markets, as well as the informational (Myers &
M^luf, 1984), incentive (Jensen 8c Meckling, 1976), and reputational (Dia
mond, 1984) difficulties associated with capital formation. Funding difficul
ties are further intensified by low historical profitability and an urgent need
to finance high levels of non-collateralizable assets. As Whited (1992) shows,
financial constraints significantly limit investment spending for even rela
tively large, publicly-traded firms. Capital limitations will surely be even more
binding for small, private firms that need to finance very rapid growth.
This paper examines three basic predictions regarding the use of venture
capital by private firms.
1. Venture capital involvement contributes to firm informational asym
metry reductions and provides reputational capital to certify firm
value to outsiders (Barry, Muscarella, Peavey III, & Vetsuypens, 1990),
and Megginson and Wiess (1991). Such benefits should stimulate
capital access and allow venture capital (VC) backed firms to achieve
greater growth than similar non-venture capital (non-VC) backed
firms.
2. The high marginal capital costs associated with venture capital fiinding (Gartner, 1988, Morris, 1987,&Sahlman, 1988) suggests that firms
with fewer alternative capital sources, higher capital requirements,
lower collateral asset values, and expected returns potentially high
enough to cover these costs may successfully obtain venture capital
funding.
3. This paper predicts that venture capitalists are particularly adept at
using convertible preferred stock, a specialized financial vehicle, as a
mechanism to align management incentives, reduce investment risk,
and provide valuable options on firms assets.
These predictions are examined using a matched sample of venture and
non-VC backed firms. Initial comparisons find VC backed firms to have lower
sustainable growth rates (a priori) than the matched set of non-VC backed
firms. In spite of this, results show VC backed firms’ actual growth rates to be
far greater than the a priori expectations implied by sustainable growth rates.
Further, VC backed firms realize greater positive spreads between sustainable
(expected) and actual (subsequent) growth than non-VC backed firms. Here,
evidence shows that both venture capitalists and the firms they back benefit
by the gains reaped through higher growth. Regzirding VC backed firm-specific
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characteristics, results show that firms with lower collateral asset values, lower
profitability, and younger age are associated with the use of venture capital.
Finally, convertible preferred stock is found to be a significant funding
mechanism associated with venture capital backing, and that its use is posi
tively related to increasing firm risk as proxied by earnings per share, collat
eral asset value, and firm age.

n.

SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

To examine the testable hypotheses, a matched sample of VC backed and
non-VC backed private gro^^-option intensive firms is identified. Initially,
390 VC backed initial public offerings issued from January 1983 through
September 1987 are identified from the Venture Capital Journal To be in
cluded, VC backed firms must be in the IDD database and must also have a
prospectus available from Bechtel Information Service. In order to generate
as comparable a matched set of VC and non-VC backed firms as possible, each
VC backed company is matched with a non-VC backed firm having the same
three digit SIC classification. When there is more than one candidate, the
non-VC backed company whose offering size is closest to that of the VC
backed firm is selected. The final sample consists of 320 VC backed and 320
non-VC backed companies.^ Financial data is gathered fi-om information pro
vided to the Securities and Exchange Commission by each firm in the prospecms
(S-1 or S-18) of its initial public offering (IPO) registration statement.
One possible limitation of the sample is the possibility that these ex-post
successful firms are not representative of private firms in general, imparting
a selection and survivorship bias. Countering this is the point that this study
focuses on the benefits of venture capital backing, not on determining the
breadth of venture capital success. The focus on the benefits of venture capital
backing necessitates the study of successful firms. Prospectuses are used since
they represent the only available comprehensive source of financial informa
tion about private firms. Further, the sample is relatively large (320 firms)
and taken from a matched strata of successful VC and non-VC backed IPO
firms in the same industry. This should reasonably control for selection bias
given this paper’s focus.

m.

PRIVATE FIRMS AND CAPITAL ACQUISITION

Private firms typically face numerous barriers to optimal capital formation.
Confined to the limited resources of the non-public capital markets they are
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unable to capture the benefits of public market monitoring. The sample firms
in this study sufifer additional firm-specific traits fiirther limiting capital
acquisition. Tables 1 and 2 summarize these characteristics and illustrate the
unique nature of the firms identified in this study.
The sample SIC code distributions presented in Table 1 illustrate the high
growth potential, high-technology industry concentrations of the sample
firms. Fully 31.1 percent of all firms are in computer and electronics related
businesses.^ Table 2 surveys sample financial characteristics and highlights
the sample firms’ need for external capital to finance subsequent growth.
First, low internal funds availability is suggested by low profitability and cash
flow measures. Median earnings per share (profitability) for the VC backed
sample is -0.045 and for the non-VC backed sample is $0.05. Median gross
cash flow to long term debt (cash flow) is 0.069 for VC backed firms and 0.455
for non-VC backed firms. Yet these same firms achieve subsequent median
Table 1
Differences in Population Proportions Using Populations Proportions Tests Between 320
Venture Capital Backed (VCB) IPO’s with Offer Amounts of $3 Million or Greater and Prices
o f at Least $5 Per Share and the Total Remaining Universe o f 2324 Non-venture Capital
Backed (NVCB) IPO’s in Industries with Venture Capital Investment Activity from Januaiy
1983 throu^ September 1987 Grouped by Four Digit SIC Code.
Proportion (percents)for Individual SIC
Code Categories
SIC Code
283
307
357
366
367
384
506
737
739

Classification
Drugs/Biologics/Pharmaceutical
Plastics/Rubber Products
Computer Equipment
Communication Equipment
Semiconductors/Electronic Components
Surgical/Medical/Dental Instruments
Electronic Parts
Prepackaged Software
Biotech and Pharmaceutical Engineering
Totals

VCB

NVCB

Z*

3.9
1.8
22.1
2.1
7.1
4.7
1.5
9.7
7.7
60.6

1.1
0.6
0.4
0.5
1.3
1.6
0.2
4.1
1.4
14.8

3.93®
2.33*’
21.01“
3.22*
6.91“
3.72“
3.08“
4.46“
7.44“
19.01“

Notes: Results are reported only for SIC codes with statistically significant results and venture capital

investment greater than 1.5 percent.
*Z is the Z score for differences in two population proportions.
^Different from zero at the one percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
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Table 2
Selected Descriptive Statistics for the Industiy-matched Set of Venture Capital Backed (VCB)
and Non-venture Capital Backed (NVCB) Firms Going Public Between January 1983 and
September 1987.

Variable

Fir Type

Number of
Observations Mean Value

Median
Value

Standard
Deviation

Total asset compound annual
growth rate (% per year)

VCB
NVCB

272
270

122.4%
211.1%

53.4%
33.2%

2.37%
12.87%

Earnings per share

VCB
NVCB

278
279

-0.307
0.034

-0.045
0.050

1.04
2.35

Earnings per share variance

VCB
NVCB

268
259

0.741
0.745

0.061
0.025

3.47
9.45

Inventory and gross plant &
equipment / total assets

VCB
NVCB

156
167

1.311
0.542

0.478
0.518

10.38
0.31

Gross cash flow /
long term debt

VCB
NVCB

112
127

-6.473
1.605

0.069
0.455

105.32
5.378

R&D Expenditures /
total assets

VCB
NVCB

309
286

0.110
0.135

0.064
0.011

0.257
0.484

Non-collateralizable expenses / VCB
total assets
NVCB

288
287

0.174
0.192

0.093
0.042

0.225
0.552

Total debt / total assets
(first financial statement)

VCB
NVCB

226
245

0.281
0.318

0.189
0.415

0.309
0.742

Total debt / total assets
(last financial statement)

VCB
NVCB

329
328

0.611
0.755

0.601
0.663

0.385
0.665

Firm age (in years)

VCB
NVCB

317
295

8.58
12.24

5.28
8.01

13.35
14.31

Notes: Information was obtained from the firm’s prospectus (S-1 or S-18) of its initial public offering

(IPO) registration statement.
^Total asset growth is calculated as the compound annual growth rate of total assets from the
first stated to the last year (just prior to the IPO) of financial data. Earnings per share variabil
ity is also calculated from the first stated to the last available year of financial data. Inventory
and gross plant and equipment/total assets, gross cash flow/long term debt, R&D expenses/to
tal assets, and non-collateralizable (RM) expenses plus selling and marketing expenses) to to
tal assets are calculated using the earliest financial data available. Total debt total assets are
calculated for both the initial provided financial statement and the last statement prior to the
IPO. Firms age is calculated as the number of years from the incorporation date to the firm’s
IPO.
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compound annual total asset growth rates of 53.4 percent for VC backed and
33.2 percent for non-VC backed firms. To achieve such growth in the face of
low profitability and cash flow (liquidity) suggests a heavy reliance on external
funding.
The sample firms are also young (even start-up) firms, with median ages
of 5.28 years for VC backed firms and 8.01 for non-VC backed firms. Their
age suggests a lack of firm reputation and high informational asymmetries.
Myers and M ^liif (1984) show how informational asymmetries would prompt
corporate managers into rationally foregoing positive NPV investment oppor
tunities if the firm’s internal cash flow is insufficient to fund these projects.
Also, Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe how such agency and incentive
problems between insider owners and outside investors would distort invest
ment decisions and reduce external funding availability.
Further exacerbating capital requirements, the sample firms also exhibit
the need to fund both research 8c development (R&D) expenses and selling
& marketing expenses to generate and exploit potential growth options. The
VC backed sample records a median ratio of 6.4 percent R&D expenses to
total assets, with the non-VC backed sample recording a 1.1 percent value.
For non-collateralizable assets (research & development plus selling & mar
keting expenses) to total assets, the VC backed sample has a median 9.3
percent while the non-VC backed sample has a median 4.2 percent. Griliches
(1986) documents a high payoff to firms successfully commercializing such
projects. Unfortunately, externally funding such growth projects is difficult
due to both the non-collateralizeable nature of the asset produced by these
expenses and the inherent difficulty involved with credibly conveying infor
mation about the value of such projects to outside investors.
A mechanism allowing these firms to overcome binding liquidity and
non-collateralizable asset constraints would allow these young, cash poor,
growth-option intensive firms to increase capital infusions and expand be
yond their ability to generate cash through existing operations. The role of
the venture capitalist as just such a mechanism is now examined.
Financial Intermediation and Venture Capital
The points outiined above suggest an economically valuable role for a
financial intermediary able to reduce informational asymmetries by gather
ing relevant inside information about a project’s potential, and simultane
ously capable of directiy funding promising growth options. By directly
funding successful growth options, financial intermediaries would benefit
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through higher portfolio returns, while firms would benefit through in
creased investment and firm growth.
Chan (1983) provides a formal model of the venture capitalist as a
financial intermediary.^ Venture capitalists appear to posses the charac
teristics of intermediaries as outlined in the classic models of Pyle (1971),
Benston and Smith (1977), Campbell and Kracaw (1980) and Diamond
(1984). Venture capitalists issue claims against themselves, using those funds
to purchase other financial assets. They also lower financial transaction costs
and capture the benefits of informational intermediation through their role
as direct investors. Venture capitalists combine the functions of an interme
diary to external capital sources, a direct investor able to exploit revealed
profit opportunities, and a corporate insider/director able to effectively
monitor and discipline management. This unique combination of roles
allows the venture capitalist to develop specialized market niches as described
in Fama and Jensen (1985).
This paper predicts that the ability to directiy fund growth options,
become corporate insiders reducing informational asymmetries, and provide
reputational capital certifying firm value to outsiders (Barry, et al., 1990; and
Megginson Be Weiss (1991)), will reduce capital formation barriers and result
in more optimal levels (higher) of firm investment.® This is tested in Table 3
by examining VC backed and non-VC backed firm differences in sustainable
(a priori or expected) and actual total asset growth rates.
Expected growth rates are measured using the “sustainable growth rate”
(SGR) methodology in Higgens (1977). Sustainable growth rates are calcu
lated as a function of a firm’s profitability and cash flow from operations, its
collateralizable asset base, and its borrowing capacity. It is measured as the
achievable growth rate assuming a constant debt ratio, payout ratio and ROE.
Note that an analysis of other sample characteristics shows that almost all
sample firms pay no dividends (Maquieira & Megginson, 1993) document a
similar point). Thus, asset growth differences subsequent to SGR time period
calculations maybe attributed to access to either external debt a n d / or equity
capital resources.
Initially, a comparison of sustainable growth rates examines the relative
future growth expectations of the two samples. Table 3, Panel A reports the
VC backed sample to have lower sustainable growth rates than the non-VC
backed sample. For every year prior to the IPO, the difference between the
VC backed and non-VC backed firms’ (VCB-NVCB) sustainable growth is
negative and significant. This suggests that, a priori, VC backed firms are
expected to have lower actual growth rates than non-VC backed firms.
However, Table 3, Panel B examines subsequent actual growth rates and
reports significant and positive differences for the VC backed subset. VC
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Sustainable Growth rates (SGR) in Panel A and Actual Growth Rates
(AGR) in Panel B for a Matched Set of 320 Venture Capital Backed and 320 Non-Venture
Capital Backed Firms.
Pand A - Stistainable Growth Bates (SGRf
Rrm Classification

SGRT-3 (N)

SGRT-2 (N)

Venture Capital Backed
-.149*’ (170)
Non-Venture Capital Backed .239“ (159)
Difference (VCB-NVCB) -.272^(76)

-.061^(228)
.222^(209)
-.036^138)

SGRT-i (N)
.043'(280)
.345=^(252)
-.358^(203)

SGRTq(N)
.122^(306)
.230^(287)
-.102^(247)

Panel B - Actual Growth Rates (AGRf
Firm Classification

AGR T-s (N)

Venture Capital Backed
.550^(194)
Non-Venture Capital Backed .395^(168)
Difference (VCB-NVCB)
.082*^(90)

AGR T- 2 (N)

.481^(236)
.394^(214)
-.031 (149)

AGR T-i (N)
.364^(272)
.257^(270)
.122*’ (207)

Panel C - Difference between Actual and Sustainable Growth (DASG = AGR —SGR)
Firm Classification

DASGT-s(N) DASG T- 2 (N) DASGT-i(N)

Venture Capital Backed
.536^(154)
Non-Venture Capital Backed .077** (139)
Difference (VCB-NVCB)
.249*» ( 65)

.538^(195)
.059*’ (180)
.315“ (106)

.272“ (240)
-.092*’ (224)
.482“ (159)

Notes: Panel C contains matched pair non-parametric tests for differences between the actual and

sustainable growth rates (AGR-SGR) across the different sets of firms. The period for which
variables are calculated include a time identifier (T.3 indicates the variable was calculated at three
years prior to the IPO). Actual growth rates are calculated as the growth in total assets for the
period indicated (AGR T-3 indicates a growth rate calculated from year -3 to year -2 prior to the
IPO).
^Different from zero at the one percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the ten percent level of significance.
^^Sustainable growth rate is calculated as:
SGR =
P\S/A)H1 +D/e)*R
l-p * (S /A )* (l+ D /E )* R

where p = profit margin, S/A = sales/total assets, D /E = debt/equity ratio, and R = retention
ratio.
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backed firms have achieved higher growth rates in total assets than their
non-VC backed counterparts. Further, Panel C shows significant and positive
differences between sustainable and actual growth rates (SGR-AGR) for the
VC backed firms relative to the non-VC backed firms (VCB-NVCB). Here, not
only are the actual growth rates shown in Panel B higher for VC backed firms,
but the spreads between actual and sustainable growth rates are also greater
for the VC backed firms.
These results suggest that firms benefit from venture capital backing by
attaining growth rates greater than non-VC backed firms, and they achieve
this in spite of the VC backed firm’s lower sustainable (expected) growth
rates. Such results would also explain why firms endure payoff striictures that
protect the venture capitalist and are also willing to concede to the potential
loss of firm control if pre-specified demanding performance standards are
not achieved.’
Firm characteristics
As illustrated above, firms experience important benefits associated with
venture capital backing. In spite of this, few firms (less than 2%) successfully
attract venture capital backing (see Gartner (1988, p. 35A-8). Thus, the next
focus is to examine which firms are more likely to attract venture capital.
Amit, Golsten, and Muller (1990) present a model predicting several
characteristics of firms likely to successfully attract venture capital.
1. With a pool of good projects and either risk averse entrepreneur’s or
a non-trivial need for new fiinds, they show that some entrepreneurs
will always seek venture capital financing.
2. If only a portion of the entrepreneurs seek venture capital, it will be
the less profitable firms.
3. They demonstrate how it may also be worthwhile for some entrepre
neurs to expend resources to reduce informational asymmetries in
conveying their ability to venture capitalists.
Three models are developed and tested in Table 4 by combining the
predications developed in Amit et al. and the predictions of this paper. Model
1 incorporates the first two predictions of Amit et al. It models the likelihood
of venture capital backing (VCB) as (1) a positive function of capital needs
and (2) a negative function of firm profitability. To proxy for a firm’s need
for fimds, gross cash flow to long term debt, sustainable growth rates, and
inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets are used. Less gross
cash flow (net income plus depreciation) to long term debt suggests a greater
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need for funds, since these young firms must at a minimum m eet debt service
to stay solvent. Lower sustainable growth rates imply higher funding needs,
holding firm decisions on the debt ratio, payout ratio, and return on equity
constant. Finally, lower inventory plus gross plant and equipment ratios imply
lower asset collateral value, suggesting a higher need for alternative capital
sources. Profitability is proxied with earnings per share, since lower profit
ability would suggest greater external funding needs. Model 1 is summarized
as follows with the expected signs of the variables indicated;
Model 1 : VCB =/(sustainable growth [-], gross cash flow to long
term debt [-], inventory plus gross plant and equipment [-] ,
earnings per share [-]).
Model 2 adds proxies for informational asymmetries to the model of Amit,
et al. If venture capitalist are indeed capable of reducing informational
asymmetries through their active role in firm management, such skills should
be more valuable to firms with greater informational asymmetries. Firm age
is used to proxy for informational asymmetry. Younger firms could be ex
pected to have greater informational asymmetries, since they have developed
less market reputation and because they are less technologically and opera
tionally established. While it is true that different industries grow and mature
at different rates, ceterus paribus, younger firms will face greater risk and
uncertainty than older firms. Venture capital investment should have a
greater impact in these young companies than in more established firms.
Model 2 : VCB =/(sustainable growth [-], gross cash flow to long
term debt [-], inventory plus gross plant and equipment [-], earn
ings per share [-], firm age [-]).
The final variable added to the model incorporates the signalling predic
tion of Amit, et al. Expending resources to signal project quality outsiders
would allow firm owners to more credibly convey the value of their project to
outside investors. The presence of convertible preferred stock is used to proxy
for owner signalling. This option granted by owners to venture capitalists
allows entrepreneurs to offer the venture capitalist not only a financial claim
superior to their own, but also an instrument that could be used to limit an
entrepreneur’s freedom of action and even replace the entrepreneur if
corporate objectives are not met. Convertible preferred stock also gives the
venture capitalist an equity claim on that portion of the gains achieved
through increased investment and asset g ro v ^ . Model 3 is summarized as:
Model 3: VCB=/(sustainable growth [-], gross cash flow to long
term debt [-], inventory plus gross plant and equipment [-J, earn
ings per share [-], firm age [-], convertible preferred stock [+]).
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Table 4
Logistic Regression Results for Tests of Models Predicting Firms Seeking Venture Capital
Backing on the Basis of Specific Firm Characteristics.
Variabk^
Intercept
Earning per share
Sustainable growth rate
Inventory and gross plant &
equipment / total assets
Gross cash flow / long term debt
Firm age in years
Use of convertible preferred stock
-2 log likelihood ratio w/intercept only
-2 log likelihood ratio at convergence
Approximate Model
Model Chi-Square
Number of observations
Notes:

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-0.26
0.91
^.14"

-2.26*^
0.37“
-0.12'

-0.36
0.25
-0.10

0.19

-0.32*’

0.33
-0.29**
-0.64*’

0.13
-0.34‘»
-0.41*’
2.52“

151.945
32.102
.150
19.846“
225

151.125
127.237
.188
23.888“
221

148.129
102.904
.439
45.225“
219

The dependent variable is a qualitative variable with 1 = the presence of venture capital backing
and 0 = no venture capital backing at the firm’s IPO.
^Different from zero at the one percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
^Different from zero at the ten percent level of significance.
^All variables remain as calculated in Table 2 and 3. The use of convertible preferred stock is
identified with a (1,0) dummy variable, based on the use of convertible preferred stock at any
point during the reported operating history of the firm. Sustainable growth is calculated using
the earliest available financial data for the firm.

Table 4 presents estimations for the three models. Regression results for
Model 1 finds significant negative relationships between the dependent
variable of VC backing and the independent variables of sustainable growth
rate and gross cash flow to long term debt. This suggests that firms with lower
sustainable growth rates and weaker cash flows are more likely to attract
venture capital, confirming the first of the Amit, et al. model predictions.
The regression estimation for Model 2 adds the informational asymmetry
proxy of age. Recall that younger firms are argued to have less reputation and
greater informational asymmetries, and are thus more likely to obtain VC
backing. Model 2 estimation finds firm age negatively related to VC backing.
This suggests that firms may benefit from the part played by the venture
capitalist in reducing informational asymmetries. As before, VC backing is
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negatively related to gross cash flow levels. However, VC backing is found
positively related to the profitability proxy of earnings per share. This is not
consistent with Amit, et al’s prediction and suggests instead that venture
capitalists finance profitable firms that have weak cash flows and that are
unable to internally finance rapid growth.
The final regression estimation, Model 3, adds convertible preferred stock
as a proxy for signalling. Results show the use of convertible preferred stock
positively related to VC backing. As Amit et al. (1990) theorize, some entre
preneurs are willing to expend resources to provide signals of firm value to
venture capitalists.
Private firms may be signalling their expectation that the project will be
successful enough to overcome the high cost of granting the venture capitalist
the valuable conversion options and potentially restrictive control mecha
nisms associated vwth convertible preferred stock. Conversely, adding con
vertible preferred stock as an independent (presumably exogenous) variable
may cause a specification problem in the model, since use of this security may
be serving as a proxy for VC backing itself This could happen if venture
capitalists choose to use this security for various, endogenous reasons other
than simply as a signalling tool. The issue of convertible preferred stock
choice is examined in the next section.
Determinants of Convertible Preferred Stock Usage

Since securities are selected to efficiendy align incentives, reduce risk, and
provide returns, Table 4 (Model 3) results lead to questions regarding specific
conditions under which convertible preferred stock is preferred by firms and
investors. We now examine (1) the factors motivating the use of convertible
preferred stock, and (2) who is more likely to use convertible preferred stock.
Sample firm traits suggest that optimal funding will occur with equity
based securities. The technologically sophisticated firms in this study exist to
exploit lucrative growth options. Myers (1977) shows that such growth-option
assets are difficult to finance extemally-particulcirly with debt capital. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) likewise describe serious agency costs associated with
the use of debt financing. Smith and Warner (1979) document significant
costs associated with enforcing debt contract covenants. Further, the earnings
variability of these rapidly-growing firms with unproven technologies a i^ e s
for less debt financing. This is shown by Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) who
find leverage ratios inversely related to earnings volatility. Also, large research
& development expenditures are fixed costs increasing operating leverage.
As Dotan and Ravid (1985) make clear, firms with high levels of operating
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leverage should use relatively less financial leverage than otherwise equiva
lent companies. In an empirical study, Titman and Wessels (1988) docu
m ent a significant negative relationship between leverage ratios and
non-collateralizable assets (such as R&D expenditures) in a firm’s asset
structure. These arguments all suggest that the growth-option-intensive in
vestment opportunity sets of private firms should be funded as much as
possible with equity rather than debt capital.
When venture capitalists are involved, convertible preferred stock offers
several attractive features.® First, while the use of convertible preferred stock
allows investors to achieve finjincial claims senior to the entrepreneur owner,
it simultaneously enhances the firm’s borrowing capacity by increasing the
firm’s equity base. Further, this hybrid security allows the venture capitalist
to maintain a tight reign over firms by creating a separate security class into
which positive and negative covenants can be inserted. This controls manage
m ent’s freedom of action in a way that voting rights alone could not achieve.
It also effectively isolates most business risk on the firm, even while claims on
superior performance (through the conversion feature) are retained by the
venture capitalist. Green’s (1984) theoretical analysis of the investment
incentives that can be achieved with debt and warrants, shows that such
convertible fixed claim securities may beneficially restructure managerial
incentives. Such a restructuring of managerial incentives may reduce the
agency cost of either equity or debt financing (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and
diminish the incentives of managers to sub-optimally invest (Myers, 1977;
Myers & M ^luf, 1984).
Convertible preferred stock (CPS) may therefore assist firms and investors
by restructuring incentives. Given such a restructuring, firms could be ex
pected to attract greater amounts of capital and achieve higher growth (such
as those in Table 3), Based on this, the use of CPS is expected to be directiy
related to actual, and inversely related to sustainable growth rates. Venture
capitalists benefit both by shifting risk to the firm and through greater control
over firm actions while using the convertability option to increase investment
leverage and potential returns. Accordingly, if convertible preferred stock is
indeed a security capable of aligning risk, then its frequency of use should be
an increasing function of firm risk. The predictions that convertible preferred
stock use is positively related to actual growth rates, firm risk, and negatively
related to sustainable growth rates, is tested in Table 5.
Table 5 models the use of convertible preferred stock as a function of four
proxies of firm risk and as a function of actual and sustainable growth rates.®
1. Earnings per share is used as a measure of firm profitability. Less
profitability should imply greater firm risk.
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Table 5
Logistic Regression Model Results for Use/Non-use (1,0) of Convertible
Preferred Stock by Venture Capitalists Based on Key Variables from a
Sample of 320 Venture Capital Backed Firms. Data for this Sample was
Gathered from Firm Financial Statements Provided in the Firm’s
Prospectus (S-1 or S-18) of its Initial Public Offering (IPO) Registration
Statement
Explanatory variabl^
Intercept
Earnings per share
Firm age in years
Gross plant and equipment to total assets
R&D expenses to total assets
Asset growth
Sustainable growth rates

Coefficient
-0.127
-1.191
-0.543
-0.289
0.289
0.466
-0.149

-2 log likelihood ratio w/intercept only
-2 log likelihood ratio at convergence
Approximate Model R^
Model Chi-Square

Chi-Square
0.03
8.69^
3.19*’
3.34*’
0.21
2.71‘^
4.47“
235.36
202.84
.16
19.72“

Notes: ^Different from zero at the one percent significance level.

^Different from zero at the five percent significance level.
^Different from zero at the ten percent significance level.
^All variable are calculated as described in Table 2, 3, and 4. Revenue
growth is calculated as the compound annual growth in revenue from the
earliest to the latest fmancial data.

2. Firm age is used as a proxy for informational asymmetry and reputa
tion. Younger firms imply greater informational asymmetries, less firm
reputation, and greater investment risk.
3. The ratio of gross plant and equipment to total assets is used as a
mezisure of collateral asset value. Firms with less collateral value should
have more difficulty in raising capital.
4. R&D expenses to total assets are used to proxy for the lack of collateral
value.
Higher levels of R&D should suggest greater risk, since these expenses
are associated with less predictable returns than other investments. Actual
growth rate is measured by the observed asset growth, while sustainable
growth rate is the same proxy as used previously.
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The model estimation in Table 5 shows earnings per share negative and
significant at the one percent level, and both firm age and the ratio of gross
plant and equipment to total assets negative and significant at the five percent
level. R&D expenses to total assets are not significant. This may occur since
higher R&D expenses may proxy not only risk, but growth options and
potential returns as well, offsetting its ability to accurately measure firm risk.
However, finding the use of convertible preferred stock to be a positive
function of other firm risk proxies suggests that its use serves to align
incentives between the firm and outside investors.
The obvious question that follows is, why is it not more commonly used?
As noted earlier, the incentive alignment benefits of convertible preferred
stock may be not only a function of firm attributes, but of investor charac
teristics. To take advantage of the control mechanisms it affords, investors
must be capable of making informed decisions. Because of their ability to
directiy invest in firms and actively participate in firm management as corpo
rate insiders, venture capitalists should be better able to utilize the risk
alignment features of convertible preferred stock. They do this while simul
taneously benefiting through the leverage of its convertability feature. The
prediction that venture capitalists will use convertible preferred stock more
firequentiy than other investors is tested by examining differences in the
frequency of convertible preferred stock use by VC backed and non-VC
backed firms.
Table 6 presents the results for a comparison of the frequency of convert
ible preferred stock use by both VC backed and non-VC backed firms. Results
show that 41.92 percent of the VC backed firms and 12.58 percent of the
matched non-VC backed firms use convertible preferred stock. Sample pro
portion tests finds this difference significant at the one percent level, showing
that convertible preferred stock is far more frequently used by VC backed
firms. This provides evidence that venture capitalists and a specific class of
firms may reap important benefits through incentive alignment achieved
through use of this complex financial security.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents an empirical examination of the gains achieved through
the interaction of venture capitalists and a sample of growth option intensive
private firms with acute capital requirements.
The symbiotic relationship between venture capitalists and the firms they
back allow each to capture the benefits of higher growth. Findings show that
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Table 6
Population Proportions and Proportion Test for Significant Differences in the Use of
Convertible Preferred Stock by Venture Capital Backed and Non-venture Capital Backed
Firms. The Sample Consists of 320 Venture Capital Backed Firms and a Matched Set of 320
Non-venture Capital Backed Firms with an Initial Public Offering between January 1983 and
September 1987.

Venture capital backed firms
Non-venture capital backed firms
Combined (total) sample
Notes:

Sample Size

Proportion with Convertible
Pr^erred Stock

ni = 320
n2 = 320
n = 668

pi = .4192
p2 = .1258
p = .2720

financial statements provided in the firm’s prospectus (S-1 or S-18) of its IPO registrations
statement were searched for evidence of convertible preferred stock use during the reported
operating history.
= 8.43 indicates positive differences significant at the one percent level for the venture capital
backed sample relative to the non-venture capital backed sample proportions.
Sample sizes represent the total number of firms in each category for which financial data has
been analyzed. The proportions listed represent the proportions of the sample that were found
to have used convertible preferred stock at any time during the reported operating history
prior to the firm’s IPO. ^ is based on difference in sample proportion statistics.

VC backed firms achieve greater growth than a matched set of non-VC backed
firms. They accomphsh this in spite of having lower sustainable growth rates
than a matched set of non-VC backed firms. Further, VC backed firms
experience larger positive differences between sustainable (expected) and
actual growth rates. Characteristics of firms likely to successfully attract
venture capital are also identified. Evidence shows that firms characterized
by younger age and higher earnings per share, but lower gross cash flow and
sustainable growth rates are associated with venture capital backing. Finally,
this paper shows that the use of convertible preferred stock is associated with
incentive alignment and risk reduction. Its use is positively related to increas
ing firm risk and revenue growth, but invereely related to sustainable growth
rates. Tests results also show convertible preferred stock is used far more
frequently by venture capital backed firms.
The findings of this paper suggest that venture capitalists act as financial
intermediaries in funding firms, having developed a special niche of high
risk, high potential return (but low profitability) firms to fund. They are an
efficient source for capital to these firms primarily due to their unique
combination of both financial and informational intermediary roles. This
combination of roles, along with the use of convertible preferred stock, allows
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venture capitalists to reduce informational asymmetries and more closely
align firm incentives with their own. The achievement of higher growth rates
for VC backed firms illustrates how venture capitalists successfully demand
rates of return on their investments far exceeding rates charged by other
intermediaries.
Firms also benefit from this relationship. Firms allow venture capitalists
(outsiders) to gam er important inside information about the value of their
projects. They expend resources (signalling) by alloMring the use of convert
ible preferred stock as a funding mechanism. Firm owners also allow the
potential of their removal if objectives are not met. Thus, the entrepre
n eu r/ owners of VC backed firms are able to effectively convince outsiders of
project value, and benefit through faster increases in their asset base than a
matched sample of non-VC backed firms.
NOTES
1.

For background on the certification role of venture capitalists during a firms Initial
Public Offering, see Barry, Muscarella, Peavey, and Vetsuypens (1990), and Megginson
and Weiss (1991). For information of the contract structures employed by venture
capital limited partnerships, see Sahlman (1988, 1990), Gartner (1988), and Bygrave
(1988). See Huntsman and Hoban (1980), Martin and Petty (1983), Brophy and Verga
(1988), and Chiampou and Kallett (1989) for literature detailing the risk and return
performance of venture capital investments in publicly traded venture capital firms.
Aspects of various venture capital investment decisions processes are discussed in
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), Robertson (1987), and Macmillan, Kulow, and Khoylian
(1988).
2. Several previously noted studies do theoretically suggest benefits and mechanisms
related to venture capital backing. However, the author believes this paper to be the
first in depth empirical analysis, outside of individual case analysis, specifically examin
ing the benefits and mechanisms associated with venture capital backing using a large
number of venture capital backed firms.
3. This same sample is the same as used in Megginson and Weiss (1991). The author
expressly thanks them for generously providing valuable financial data.
4. To construct the matched sample, the universe o f 2,644 firm commitment IPOs issued
from January 1983 through September 1987 is obtained from Investment Dealers’
Digest Corporate Database (IDD). After eliminating financial institutions, S&Ls, and
firms whose first day trading price is unavailable from Standard and Poor*s Daily Stock
Record: Over-the-Counter, the remaining sample of firms from which matches are identi
fied consists of 1,845 offers. To formally test whether venture capitalists concentrate
their investment in particular industries (i.e., high-tech), the industry distribution of
VC backed IPOs is examined for significant differences from the universe of all 2644
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IPOs during the study period. The hypothesis that these two groups are drawn from the
same population of firms can be rejected at the one percent significance level.
There are two other economic roles played by the venture capitalist. First, venture
capitalists are expected to perform a certification function during initial public offerings
when they, along with auditors and investment bankers, place their reputational capital
at risk to certify that the offering price incorporates all relevant private information.
Second, venture capitalists who retain their ownership stakes in newly-public firms
perform the management monitoring function typically expected of large-block share
holders. See Barry et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991).

6.

In an analogous fashion, Koshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1989) examine a set of
Japanese firms with informational (Myers & Majluf, 1984) and incentive (Jensen and
Meckling) problems. They find that those firms which are associated with a “Keiretsu”
(industrial group) are less concerned with liquidity than those which are not, and that
they are thus able to pursue a more optimal investment strategy.

7.

Several authors—including Gartner (1988), Morris (1987) and Sahlman (1988)—have
documented that venture capitalists expect compound annual returns on the privatefirm investments they make to range from 25 to over 50 percent, depending upon the
stage of project development. The payoff structure implied here is the use of convertible
preferred stock. The specific arguments for this security are presented later.

. 8.

The use of convertible preferred stock (CPS) has been previously suggested by Sahlman
(1988, 1990), Colder (1987), and Testra (1987). However, the author knows of no
formal test (1) to determine actual frequency of CPS use by venture capitalists in a
sizeable sample, or (2) to examine characteristic differences in CPS usage between
venture capital backed and non-venture capital backed firms.

9.

Note that it can only be determined if a firm has CPS in its capital structure at the time
of (or within three years of) its IPO. If the firm had used CPS early in its history, there
may be no evidence of that fact remaining in the financial statements disclosed with its
IPO. This measure of CPS usage must therefore be considered a lower bound. Further,
firms are not consistent in the method for reporting the use of CPS. Since most firms
eliminate CPS from their capital structure prior to the IPO, disclosure requirements are
limited. Thus, a m^'ority of firms do not report additional information such as common
share equivalents, the size of the block held by any one individual, or voting rights.
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